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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jose Gonzalez filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting, in part, that his 
guilty plea was involuntary as a result of his trial counsel's threat of violence if he did not 
accept the State's plea offer. Mr. Gonzalez asserts that the district court erred in 
granting the State's motion for summary dismissal of this issue, because there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his guilty plea was an involuntary product of 
his trial counsel's coercion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Jose Gonzalez pied guilty to 
aggravated assault and misdemeanor malicious injury to property, and was sentenced 
to a total unified term of five years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.5-6; see also Exhibits 
(Transcripts of Entry of Plea hearing and Sentencing hearing).) Mr. Gonzalez filed a 
timely petition for post-conviction relief and accompanying documentation, and the 
district court granted his request for appointed counsel. (R., pp.5-71.) The district court 
also granted Mr. Gonzalez's request to file an amended petition. (R., pp.93-108.) 
In his amended petition, Mr. Gonzalez made the following claims, 
7. Stacey Gosnell, now known as Stacey De Pew ("Depew") 
represented Petitioner at all material times herein in his Underlying 
Criminal Case. 
8. Through the course of Depew's representation of Petitioner, 
Petitioner informed Depew on several occasions that he wanted a trial in 
the manner (sic) so as to cross-examine his accusers, to produce 
evidence as to what happened during his alleged criminal acts, and to 
assert potential defenses as to Petitioner's state of mind or involuntary 
intoxication during all relevant times during his alleged criminal acts. 
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9. On November 26, 2013, Petitioner met with Depew in the 
Jerome County Court Annex. Petitioner was held in the holding cells 
behind the courtrooms, and Depew came back and visited with Petitioner 
at that location. 
10. During their meeting, Depew spoke witr1 Petitioner out loud 
and in the presence of other inmates, including, but not limited to Nathan 
Guymon.1 
11. During their conversation and meeting, Depew represented 
to Petitioner that if he were to take the plea deal offered by the prosecutor 
of one (1) year fixed with four (4) indeterminate, that he would be 
guaranteed parole after one (1) year. 
12. During their meeting, Petitioner once again told Depew that 
he wanted to go to trial so as to cross-examine his accusers, to produce 
evidence as to what happened during his alleged criminal acts, and to 
assert potential defenses as to Petitioner's state of mind or involuntary 
intoxication during all relevant times during his alleged criminal acts. 
13. Depew then told Petitioner, in words or substance, that if he 
did not take the deal offered by the prosecutor, that she would strangle 
him. 
14. Following Depew's statements Petitioner was both afraid of 
Depew in her threats, but he also lacked all confidence in Depew as his 
attorney to advocate for him at trial, and as such wholeheartedly believed 
that his only option in his case was to plea[d] guilty. 
15. Following Petitioner's conversation with Depew, Petitioner 
went in front of the District Court and entered a plea of guilty to 
Aggravated Assault, I. C. § 18-905 and Malicious Injury to Property, I.C. § 
18-7001 in accordance with a plea agreement. 
16. Petitioner did not bring up the threat of violence from Depew 
or his complete lack of confidence in Depew's representation to the 
District Court, as he believed that he had no further options in the matter 
and because he was afraid of his attorney. 
1 Mr. Gonzalez attached an affidavit from Mr. Guymon to his initial pro se petition, in 
which Mr. Guymon swore that on the day Mr. Gonzalez entered his guilty plea, he 
witnessed trial counsel tell Mr. Gonzalez, "'After all of this, if you change your mind and 
back out on me now by not taking this deal, I'm going to come through those bars and 
strangle you."' (R., pp.36-37.) 
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17. Petitioner believes that his guilty plea was not voluntary or 
intelligent given the facts contained herein. 
18. Had Depew not threatened Petitioner, he would not have 
accepted the plea agreement with the State of Idaho and would not have 
entered a guilty plea in this matter. 
19. Also, Depew misinformed Petitioner of the consequences of 
the plea deal, which Petitioner did not fully understand, specifically in 
relation to parole in the State of Idaho. As such, Petitioner's entering of a 
guilty plea was not intelligent. 
20. Petitioner seeks recourse in this matter in asking for his 
allowance to withdraw his guilty plea and further pursue trial in the 
charges in his Underlying Criminal Case. 
(R., pp.104-106.) 
The State filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.114-118, 
144-164.) The State asserted that, even assuming that trial counsel made the threat 
alleged by Mr. Gonzalez, the record demonstrates that Mr. Gonzalez's plea was not a 
product of that threat, and was therefore not coerced. (R., pp.145-158.) The State 
asserted that it was not reasonable for Mr. Gonzalez to believe that his trial counsel 
could actually carry out the threat, considering it was witnessed by a guard and at least 
one other inmate, and bars separated the two when the threat was made. (R., p.147.) 
The State further asserted that Mr. Gonzalez's statements during the entry of plea 
hearing, his recitation of what happened contained in the PSI, and his statements during 
the sentencing hearing, all indicate that Mr. Gonzalez entered his guilty plea voluntarily, 
and that he was satisfied with trial counsel. (R., pp.147-158.) As to Mr. Gonzalez's 
claim that his plea was not intelligent due to trial counsel telling him that he was 
guaranteed to be paroled after one year, the State asserted that this claim contradicts 
Mr. Gonzalez's claim that he was coerced into entering his guilty plea by trial counsel's 
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threat, and further asserted that the claim is not supported by any evidence. 
(R., pp.158-160.) 
Mr. Gonzalez filed a written reply to the State's motion for summary dismissal 
and "Petitioner's Statement of Undisputed Facts, Omitted Material Facts, and Genuine 
Issues of Material Fact." (R., pp.171-180, ·183-188.) Mr. Gonzalez asserted that the 
remaining genuine issues of material fact were, "What affect Ms. Depew's threatening 
statement and conduct in Petitioner's case had on Petitioner while he went forward to 
the change of plea hearing on November 26, 2012?" and "Whether Ms. Depew was 
ineffective as Petitioner's counsel when she told Petitioner that he was guaranteed 
parole after onf3 year of incarceration?" (R., p.187.) The State filed a reply to 
Mr. Gonzalez's reply arguing that he did make any assertions regarding the prejudice 
prong of his claim that trial counsel told him he would be paroled after one year. 
(R., pp.189-193.) 
During a hearing on the State's summary dismissal motion, counsel for 
Mr. Gonzalez asserted that the court should infer that he was under continuing duress 
from his trial counsel's threat, "and that's something we would like to parse out in an 
evidentiary hearing." (Tr., p.4, L.15 - p.5, L.6.) Counsel for Mr. Gonzalez further 
asserted, 
[A]ssuming the facts are in favor of my client, it would be this, that 
on the 26th he was back behind in the holding cells. Ms. DePew went 
back there at that time. 
Through (sic) numerous times he had asked Ms. DePew to call 
certain witnesses and the like, and for whatever reason Mr. Gonzalez was 
not satisfied with her. 
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At that time he says, "Hey, I vvant to go to trial." Ms. DePew says, 
"Well, if you don't take the deal, I'm going to reach through and strangle 
you." However that was characterized. 
He then, in his mind, as part of his petition, he says, "Well, I don't 
trust this person anymore. She's now threatened me. I not only distrust 
her, but I'm scared of her.["] 
He comes in and goes, well, at least in - at least the worse that can 
happen to me is we go in and the state's going to be recommending 
something that will, in the event the judge accepts it, will allow me - I'll be 
on parole in a year. And that's if, of course, the evidentiary hearing and 
everything went my client's way. 
I'm not in his head. I've had an opportunity to sit down and meet 
with Mr. Gonzalez on multiple times, but that's essentially what I've gotten 
from him. I'm sitting next to somebody I don't trust. They're supposed to 
be my attorney. I'm scared of them and but I know all I've got to lose 
here is this if I go forward. And so I do believe there's enough facts, and 
that's what we to essentially (sic) to parse out at an evidentiary hearing. 
(Tr., p.7, L:1 p 8, L.7.) The court took the matter under advisement. (Tr., p.8, Ls.15-
17.) 
The district court entered a Memorandum Decision RE: Motion for Summary 
Dismissal granting the State's motion. (R., pp.200-218.) The court took judicial notice 
of the Register of Actions, the transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing 
hearings, the PSI and attached documents,2 and Mr. Gonzalez's Rule 35 motion and 
attached documents. (R., p.202.) The court found that the transcript of Mr. Gonzalez's 
entry of plea showed that the plea was entered consistently with the requirements of 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11; thus, there was prima facie evidence that the plea was 
voluntary and knowing. (R., pp.205-209.) The court continued, 
2 Mr. Gonzalez has filed a motion to augment the record with a copy of his Pre-
Sentence Investigation Report and attached documents. The motion to augment is 
currently pending. 
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In this case, despite taking the facts alleged in the petition as true, 
under the totality of the circumstances Petitioner's plea was not coerced 
though the threat was directed at the Petitioner and his plea. In addition to 
the Rule 11 (c) prima facie evidence of voluntariness discussed supra, 
Petitioner's contention that the plea was a product of trial counsel's 
coercion is further undermined by his own prior filings and surrounding 
circumstances which are: (1) inconsistent with the alleged coercion, (2) 
show an absence of well-grounded fear for his own safety, and (3) reflect 
ample time and opportunity to escape the supposed danger. 
(R., p.211.) After analyzing the record, the court found, 
Therefore, taking the Petitioner's allegations as fact, the Petitioner 
is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea based on coercion since an 
innocent person would not have felt compelled to plead guilty in light of the 
totality of the circumstances. Petitioner's claim is without merit because: 
(1) the Petitioner's guilty plea was taken in accordance with I.C.R. 11 (c) 
raising the presumption that it was knowing and voluntary; (2) Petitioner's 
statement regarding when trial counsel threatened him is inconsistent with 
court records; (3) Petitioner's contention that he was afraid of DePew 
following the threat is not objectively supported by the record as he had 
multiple opportunities before and after entering his plea to bring such 
sincerely held fear to the attention of the Court; and (4) Petitioner had 
opportunity, even assuming he was afraid of DePew, to evade the alleged 
harm threatened since the coercive statement occurred while DePew and 
Petitioner were physically separated. Therefore, because Gonzalez's 
allegations in his Petition are disproved by evidence (and the lack thereof) 
in the record he is not entitled to post-conviction relief or withdrawal his 
guilty plea based on coercion by trial counsel. 
(R., pp.211-214.) Regarding Mr. Gonzalez's claim that trial counsel guaranteed parole 
after one year rendering his plea invalid, the court found that any alleged mistaken 
characterization of the time Mr. Gonzalez would have to serve in prison did not affect 
the voluntariness of the plea.3 (R., pp.241-217.) 
Mr. Gonzalez timely appealed from the district court's Judgment summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition. (R., pp.219-220, 223-226.) 
3 Mr. Gonzalez does not the summary dismissal of this claim in this appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in granting the State's motion for summary dismissal of 
Mr. Gonzalez's claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, because there exists a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his guilty plea was a product of his 
counsel's coercion? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Err In Granting The State's Motion For Summary Dismissal Of 
Mr. Gonzalez's Claim That His Guilty Plea Was Involuntary, Because There Exists A 
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether His Guilty Plea Was A Product Of His 
Counsel's Coercion 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Gonzalez claimed that, after his trial counsel threatened to strangle him if he 
did not accept the State's plea offer, he was both afraid of his trial counsel and he 
lacked confidence in her. While the district court addressed Mr. Gonzalez's claim of 
fear in granting the State's motion for summary dismissal, the court failed to address 
Mr. Gonzalez's claim that he lacked confidence in his trial counsel, and how that lack of 
confidence affected the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Because there exists a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Gonzalez's guilty plea was coerced by trial 
counsel's conduct, the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim. 
B. Standards Of Review 
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature, and like a 
plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the 
requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original 
post-conviction petition must allege more than merely "a short and plain statement of 
the claim." Id. at 443-444. The application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained therein, or else the post-
conviction petition may be subject to dismissal. Id. In addition, the post-conviction 
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petition must set forth with specificity the legal grounds upon which the application is 
based. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (20·10). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through 
post-conviction proceedings. Thomas v. State, 185 P.3d 921 (Ct. App. 2008). To 
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show that 
trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984 ); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 ('1988). Where a defendant 
shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a "reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
vvould have been different." Strickland, at 694; Aragon at 760. 
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the 
petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. "A material fact has 'some logical connection with the 
consequential facts[,]' Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." Id. On 
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. 
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1993). '"[W]here the evidentiary facts are 
not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary 
judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the 
court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences."' 
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Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444 ( quoting Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 5"15, 519 
(1982).) Furthermore, 
"When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is 
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion 
for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most 
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." 
Id. (quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437 (1991 ).) 
The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether there 
exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether "the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 'The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry 
of determining whether there is the need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are 
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 
250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner "must be 
regarded as true" for purposes of summary dismissal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 
247, 250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, 
and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of 
the non-moving party." Vavo/d v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). 
C. The District Court Erred In Granting The State's Motion For Summary Dismissal 
Of Mr. Gonzalez's Claim That His Guilty Plea Was Involuntary, Because There 
Exists A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether His Guilty Plea Was A 
Product Of Trial Counsel's Coercion 
In his amended petition, Mr. Gonzalez asserted that he was both afraid of his 
attorney and lost confidence in her, as a result of her threat to strangle him if he did not 
agree to accept the State's plea offer. (R., pp.104-105.) Specifically, he stated that 
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"[f]ollowing Depew's statements Petitioner was both afraid of Depew in her threats, but 
he also lacked all confidence in Depew as his attorney to advocate for him at trial, 
and as such wholeheartedly believed that his only option in his case was to plea 
guilty." (R., p.105 (emphasis added).) Thus, Mr. Gonzalez asserted that his guilty plea 
was involuntary. (R., pp.104-105.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has described the test for determining whether or not 
a guilty plea is voluntary as follows: 
Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three 
areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense 
that he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; 
(2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a 
jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incrirninating himself; 
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading 
guilty. It is clear that the voluntariness of a guilty plea can be 
determined by considering all of the relevant surrounding 
circumstances contained in the record. 
State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34 (1976) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Idaho 
Court of Appeals has observed, "[a] plea of guilty is deemed coerced only where it is 
improperly induced by ignorance, fear or fraud." State v. Spry, 127 Idaho 107, 110 
(Ct. App.1995) (citing Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813 (1969); Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 
588 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added)). "If an innocent person would have felt 
compelled to plead guilty in light of the circumstances, it can properly be said that the 
plea was involuntary." Spry, 127 Idaho at 110-111 (citing Mata, supra.). 
The parties stipulated that trial counsel threatened Mr. Gonzalez with physical 
violence if he did not take accept the State's plea offer, and stipulated that Mr. Gonzalez 
was both afraid of his trial counsel and that he lacked confidence in her. (R., pp.165, 
183-184.) The district court found that Mr. Gonzalez's fear of his trial counsel did not 
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result in his guilty plea for multiple reasons; however, the court failed to analyze how 
Mr. Gonzalez's lack of confidence in his trial counsel played into the voluntariness of his 
plea. (See generally R., pp.200-2'18 (Memorandum Decision RE: Motion for Summary 
Dismissal).) Mr. Gonzalez asserts that an innocent person who desires to take their 
case to trial and has expressed this desire to their counsel, would nonetheless plead 
guilty if that innocent person was both afraid of and lacked confidence in their trial 
counsel, upon counsel threatening that innocent person with violence if they did not 
accept a plea agreement. 
While the district court correctly recognized that there is a rebuttable presumption 
that guilty pleas entered consistently with the requirements of I.C.R. 11 (c) are voluntary 
and knowing (.see R., pp.206-207 (citing Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99 (1999)), a 
factual stipulation that Mr. Gonzalez was both afraid of and lost confidence in his trial 
counsel due to trial counsel's threat of physical violence (see R., pp.165, 183-184 ), 
surely overcomes that presumption. As such, Mr. Gonzalez asserts that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not his guilty plea was voluntary. 
Therefore, the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gonzalez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
Judgment summarily dismissing his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, and 
remand his case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. 
DATED this tti day of May, 2015. 
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